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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682169

1 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 184th
Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), Period Ending 30 April 1968

AD 837649

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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*Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: FOR-OT-RD, used OCT 20310*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 184TH ORDNANCE BATTALION (AMMO)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96238

12 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
for Period Ending 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968, RCS
CSFOR-65 (RL)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN:
AVCA-QN-GO-H, APO 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-O,
APO 96384

Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-
DST, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. During the reporting period the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammunition) (Direct Support) continued to perform its mission as a conventional ammunition battalion.

b. The battalion's capabilities remained the same as no new units have been assigned or attached and there have been no units reassigned. The battalion assumed the operational responsibility of Ammunition Supply Point 340, located at An Khe, on 18 March 1968. A tactical move to BR 450455 took place at 180900 March 1968 with 54 men and 9 vehicles. Two of the three assigned ammunition companies have acquired new commanders. Captain Beau B. Beard has assumed command of the 820th Ordnance Company (Ammo) and Captain Paul J. Bourque is commanding the 630th Ordnance Company (Ammo). The battalion has been engaged in combat service support operations during the entire ninety day reporting period.

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

c. Mission:

(1) The battalion's primary mission is the operation of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot (QNABD). Additional missions of the battalion are the operation of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot Brass Yard Annex and Ammunition Supply Point 340 (BR 450455). All assigned units are functionally organized in direct support of the Depot mission.

(2) The following tonnages indicate the battalion's lift activities during the reporting period:

<u>QNABD</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Total</u>
Issues	29,691.1	27,943.8	24,035.0	81,669.9
Receipts	16,344.2	30,685.1	30,337.3	77,366.6
Rewarehousing	<u>5,442.2</u>	<u>12,270.4</u>	<u>7,698.2</u>	<u>25,410.8</u>
Total	51,477.5	70,899.3	62,070.5	184,447.3

<u>ASP 340</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Total</u>
Issues	614.9	2,992.9	3,607.3
Receipts	1908.0	4,814.2	6,722.2
Rewarehousing	<u>1570.6</u>	<u>4,336.5</u>	<u>5,907.1</u>
Total	4,093.5	12,143.6	16,236.6

Brass Yard Retrograde of Salvage: 12,210

QNABD:	184,477.3
ASP 340:	16,236.6
Brass Yard:	<u>12,210.0</u>
Total	212,923.9 S/T

d. As of 30 April 1968 this battalion was supporting the following organizations with personnel and equipment:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>
FSA McDonald	1	0	1	16
FSA Lathrop	0	0	1	9
FSA Brown	0	0	2	6
FSA Moroz	1	0	0	3
FSE Frazier	0	0	2	1
Da Nang Sup Cmd	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	2	0	6	85

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Organization

Equipment

FSA McDonald

1ea Generator 3KW
1ea Trailer, 3/4ton
1ea Truck, Cargo 3/4ton
w/Teletype Converter

FSE Kay

1ea Radio, AN/GRC 46A
1ea Trailer, 3/4ton
1ea Antenna Group
1ea Radio-Teletypewriter, AN/GRC

Pleiku SAC

1ea Forklift 6,000 R/T

Da Nang Support Cmd

2ea Forklift 6,000 R/T
1ea Truck, Utility, 1ton/Trl
1ea Crane, 20ton, R/T
1ea Truck, Cargo 2 1/2ton

e. The battalion continued a vigorous self-help building program during the reporting period. This construction has resulted in a new two story troop billet, shower, dayroom, orderly rooms, BEQ, mess halls, PX, and BOQ in the battalion cantonment. Physical security has been improved by the installation of flood lights completely around the perimeter and the construction of triple-concertina and barbed wire fence. Bunker improvement and clearing of jungle from the surrounding hillsides continues with organic bulldozers. A new fence of German concertina wire is being installed around the ABD. Clearing of jungle and building of perimeter road around ABD continues. Both new and replacement guard towers have been constructed and the internal security WD 1 wiring completely replaced with five pair cable. The security area, destroyed during TET, has been rebuilt and a complete MHE motor pool constructed in the ABD.

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2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Upgrading motor sergeant (TO&E 9-86F para 02 line 05) from E-5 to E-6.

(a) OBSERVATION. The duty of motor sergeant under TO&E 9-86F encompasses the maintenance of 28 vehicles and 3 generators. A SGT E-5 has neither the experience nor rank to exercise the control and supervisory functions inherent in this number of personnel and equipment.

(b) EVALUATION. Upgrading the position of motor sergeant under TO&E 9-86F would allow the position to be filled by a skilled and experienced NCO capable of exercising complete technical supervision over his subordinates. The motor sergeant is responsible for 28 vehicles, 3 generators, 6 motor pool personnel, and operators for all equipment. It is essential that assigned equipment be maintained at the highest level in order to insure the accomplishment of the unit mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The position of motor sergeant (MOS 63B40) be upgraded from E-5 to E-6.

(2) Addition of armorer (MOS 76Y30) to TO&E 9-86F.

(a) OBSERVATION. TO&E 9-86F authorizes 102 M-14 rifles; 5, .45 Cal pistols; 2 M-60 machineguns; and 2, 3.5 rocket launchers; but does not authorize a trained armorer for the repair and maintenance of these weapons.

(b) EVALUATION. Experience has shown that because of the enemy situation in Vietnam there is a continuing issue and turn-in of weapons. TO&E 9-86F indicates that the unit supply sergeant will perform the duties of the unit armorer. It is impossible for the supply sergeant to function as the armorer and perform his other duties. Supply personnel not trained in the maintenance and repair of small arms cannot keep assigned weapons at the necessary level of readiness required in a combat zone. The addition of an armorer to TO&E 9-86F will insure performance of proper weapon maintenance and repair, thus increasing unit combat readiness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. An armorer, grade E-4 MOS 76Y30 be authorized under 9-86F.

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(3) Addition of Administration Specialist (MOS 71L20) to
TO&E 9-17E.

(a) OBSERVATION. The administrative work load in an ammunition company (TO&E 9-17E) exceeds the capabilities of a single company clerk (MOS 71H20).

(b) EVALUATION. TO&E 9-17E authorizes one company clerk to perform the administrative duties for the following authorized personnel: 223 EM; 2 WO; 3 OFF. The work load consists of performing duties such as preparing drafts, typing, and assembling unit publications, orders, and reports. Prepares unit morning report, prepares allotments and all matters pertaining to finance, routes communications, correspondence, request for directives, publications, and travel orders to the higher headquarters. Answers personal and telephone inquiries relating to administrative and clerical matters. Sets up and maintains alphabetical and numerical files and filing systems. Prepares statistical information to be post to office records at higher headquarters. The addition of an administration specialist (MOS 71L20) to TO&E 9-17E would apportion the administrative work load and lead to professional office procedure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. TO&E 9-17E authorizes an administrative specialist (MOS 71L20) to the company headquarters.

b. Operations.

(1) Enemy mines on improved roads.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the reporting period two heavy vehicles sustained moderate damage due to enemy mines planted on the shoulder of an improved asphalt road (QL 1).

(b) EVALUATION. Enemy antivehicular mines were planted on an improved asphalt road at a point where the road curves sharply. The vehicles were traveling in excess of the posted speed and were required to move onto the shoulder of the road to avoid overturning. The mines were dug in at the point of maximum curve thus the vehicle detonated the mines and were severely damaged.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Drivers should be cautioned to stay off the shoulder of all roads except in emergency situations. Drivers should be further warned not to exceed the posted speed limit on curves.

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(2) Booby trapped packages.

(a) OBSERVATION. A package being carried by three Vietnamese children to two MP gate guards exploded as the children approached.

(b) EVALUATION. A Vietnamese man paid the three children 60 piasters to deliver the package to the MP's. Upon detonation two of the children were killed and the other seriously injured. The MP's were unharmed. The explosive device was suspected to be either a clockwork or chemically activated bomb.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Military personnel should suspect any packages offered to them by Vietnamese Nationals to be booby trapped in some manner.

(3) Storage area maintenance

(a) OBSERVATION. A constant requirement exists within the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot for heavy maintenance of roads, berms, and storage sites. Construction equipment is required on a full-time basis.

(b) EVALUATION. Ammunition storage sites, particularly in Vietnam, are occupied for long periods. The Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot is relatively permanent with concrete storage pads, earthen berms, and rock surfaced roads. The maintenance of these sites becomes a permanent problem due to recurring damage by monsoons and heavy traffic. Bulldozers organic to the ammunition companies have proved inadequate for road and berm building because of their inability to move dirt between locations or to construct a hard and smooth road surface. The authorization of a road grader, sheep-foot roller, scoop loader, and dump trucks, to TO&E 9-86F would provide a capability for storage site preparation and maintenance including pads, roads, berms and security measures. It is felt that if full-time utilization of equipment can be justified then inclusion within TO&E authorization is appropriate. Assuming complete initial construction by Engineer units, the problems of daily upkeep and maintenance will dictate maximum use of this equipment if acceptable safety and operating procedures are to be sustained. Repair and maintenance services performed by Engineer support after initial construction are either non-existent or available only after an unacceptable time delay.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. TO&E 9-86F authorize the following Engineer equipment for ammunition storage site construction and

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maintenance:

Grader, Road, Motorized	1ea
Roller, Sheep-Foot, Towed	1ea
Loader, Scoop-Type, Wheeled	1ea
Truck, Dump, 5 ton	1ea

(4) Maneuverability and emplacement of cranes

(a) OBSERVATION. A commercial crane could be employed advantageously as a substitute for the authorized 5 ton crane.

(b) EVALUATION. TO&E 9-17E authorizes four truck-mounted 5 ton rough terrain cranes for ammunition handling. The 20 ton truck-mounted crane, earth, rough terrain and standard, are in use as substitute items. The Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot employs both the organic 20 ton cranes and commercial cranes operated by civilian contractor. The Kyoei K-70A crane has proved very effective by comparison to the larger military crane. The commercial crane is readily emplaced with hydraulic outriggers, is quickly displaced for redeployment, and has a capacity of 7.7 short tons which is more than sufficient for ammunition handling. The boom is retractable which increases the versatility of the crane. While the 5 ton rough terrain crane is the preferred item, the current substitute is the 20 ton crane. Experience with the larger crane has shown much greater time required for maintenance than with the commercial crane. Experience with the 5 ton wrecker has shown it to be unsatisfactory for ammunition handling over extended periods due to the maintenance requirements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a commercial crane similar to the Kyoei K-70A crane shown in Inclosure 1 be utilized as a substitute for the authorized 5 ton rough terrain crane where possible.

c. Training.

(1) Inventory training of ammunition personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel arriving in Vietnam trained in MOS 55B are not sufficiently trained in inventory procedures for ammunition.

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

(b) EVALUATION. Personnel assigned in MOS 55B have a definite lack of knowledge and ability in the inventory procedures to be used in ammunition accounting. The volume of transactions experienced here causes the majority of inventory and counting of receipts and issues to be accomplished by ammunition handlers. The introduction of the palletization concept, the increase in the variety of ammunition types, and the high volume of ammunition handled in Vietnam complicate the inventory effort. An increased ability in the ammunition storage specialist to cope with the inventory requirements would result directly in better management data at all levels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That inventory and receipts and issue accounting procedures for ammunition be stressed in 55B MOS producing courses and that aptitude area CL be included in the mental requirements for MOS 55B.

d. Intelligence. NONE

e. Logistics.

(1) Sea-Land container usage.

(a) OBSERVATION. Sea-Land Transportation Company equipment was used on a trial basis for the retrograde shipment of expended ammunition components to CONUS. This system proved more efficient than conex shipments.

(b) EVALUATION. The lift requirements for packing Sea-Land containers is one-half that required for conex containers. Additionally, no cargo vehicles are required to transport the Sea-Land containers. Packing and preparation is also faster for the Sea-Land containers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That Sea-Land containers be used for the retrograde shipment of expended ammunition components.

(2) Strapping of ammunition.

(a) OBSERVATION. A comparison of 1½ inch to 2 inch steel strapping shows the 1½ inch to be most practical for ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION. The 1½ inch steel strapping is the optimum size for banding boxes to pallets and pallets to vehicles. The 2 inch strapping has proved cumbersome and awkward. The time needed to handle ammunition in correspondingly increased with the use of 2 inch strapping.

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RCS CSFOR-65 (R)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That 1½ inch steel strapping be provided as the standard strapping material for ammunition purposes.

(3) Small lot size in CONUS shipments.

(a) OBSERVATION. Ships discharging ammunition at Qui Nhon have contained numerous small lots for a particular MODIC. The following list of lots and corresponding quantities in eight-round pallets of 155mm HE projectiles (1320-D544) from the North Platte Victory is typical:

<u>LOT NO.</u>	<u>NO. PALLETs</u>	<u>LOT NO.</u>	<u>NO. PALLETs</u>
LOF 1-20	134	LOF 5-28	333
LOF 3-25	392	LOF 5-29	2775
LOF 3-29	177	LOF 5-31	539
LOF 3-34	132	LOF 5-32	13
LOF 3-93	535	LOF 5-34	1314
LOF 3-97	1010	LOFS -43	182
LOF 3-99	203	LOFS -44	1
LOF 3-116	188	LOFS -46	153
LOF 3-125	68	LOF 5-51	69
LOF 3-128	125	LOFS -52	294
LOF 3-130	126	LOFS -54	318
LOF 3-140	216	LOFS -56	135
LOF 3-141	23	LOFS -58	120
LOF 3-143	397	LOFS -60	39
LOF 3-146	118	LOFS -64	15
LOF 5-20	1	LOFS -76	56
LOF 5-26	440	LOFS -166	571
LOF 5-27	488		

(b) EVALUATION. Such a large number of lots for a particular item of ammunition greatly increases the storage and accounting functions. Poor utilization of storage space results because of necessary lot separation distances which must be maintained on storage pads. The probability of accounting errors is greater when additional entries are made into the ammunition stock records systems. Needless to say, the ammunition surveillance problem is directly proportional to the number of lots on hand.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That small lots be shipped only when absolutely necessary and that CONUS depots make a positive effort to use these "tag ends" either for training purposes or shipment to inactive theatres.

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
Operational Report for Period 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(4) Retrograde of ammunition.

(a) OBSERVATION. Ammunition packed for retrograde in conex containers is more suitable for shipment than that shipped in pallets.

(b) EVALUATION. Ammunition selected for retrograde from Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot has generally been in deteriorated packing. The lack of packing materials to repack ammunition prior to retrograde can result in damage during shipment. To preclude this, conex containers have been used successfully to pack retrograde ammunition. Mortar ammunition is particularly suited to conex packing. An added advantage is the return of conex containers to CONUS for reuse.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That conex containers be used more extensively for retrograde of ammunition.


EDMUND J. OLSEN
LTC, OR/C
Commanding

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AVCA-QN-GO-H (12 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) for
Period Ending 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO San Francisco 96238

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO 96384

8 MAY 1968

The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) has been reviewed and is considered adequate with the following comments:

- a. Section 2, Paragraphs 2a(1), 2a(2) and 2a(3). The unit should submit a request for changes to the MTOE in accordance with USARV Regulation 310-31.
- b. Section 2, Paragraph 2b(3). Full time use of engineer construction equipment at Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot is not justified. However, in RVN where repair and maintenance service is not readily available because of diversion of engineer support to projects with higher priority, it becomes necessary in the operation of the ammunition base depot to have a repair and maintenance capability for pads, road, berms and security needs within the base depot if safety requirements are to be met.
- c. Section 2, Paragraph 2b(4). Use of the commercial type crane similar to the Kyasi K-70A has merit. However, use of commercial equipment would place an undue strain on the maintenance and supply system unless contract maintenance was available to provide support. The unit should submit a request for change to the MTOE in accordance with USARV Regulation 310-31.
- d. Section 2, Paragraph 2e(1). Sea-Land containers are authorized for the shipment of expended ammunition components provided CONEX containers are not readily available. This headquarters agrees that the use of Sea-Land containers is a more efficient means of shipping ammunition components than using CONEX's.
- e. Section 2, Paragraph 2e(4). Retrograde ammunition such as small caliber rounds packed in wooden boxes that have become deteriorated are best retrograded to CONUS in CONEX's. Large caliber items would not be practical for CONEX shipment because only a few rounds would "cube-out" a CONEX before it would "weight-out".

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W.E. BOTTERBUSH
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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AVCA GO-0 (12 May 68) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
for Period Ending 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R-1)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, paragraph c. Concur. The recommendation to stress inventory, receipt and issue accounting procedures for ammunition in 55B MOS courses will be forwarded to Redstone Arsenal.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph e(1). Concur. Sea-Land containers are the most efficient means for shipping expended ammunition components as well as other compatible cargo. However, current COMUSMACV policy (COMUSMACV Mag UNCLAS 15519 DTG 30227Z May 68) limits the use of Sea-Land Vans at all RVN ports except Saigon which is authorized use of Sea-Land for CONUS retrograde of all container compatible dry cargo. A recent AMC staff visit to RVN indicated that Army owned Sea-Land Vans will be in service between Vietnam and CONUS beginning in Oct - Nov 1968. This action may set aside present restrictions on the use of Sea-Land.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph e(2). Units may order 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ inch strapping as required.


d. Reference Section II, paragraph f(4). Concur with paragraph e, 1st Indorsement. A study is being conducted on the feasibility of adopting the locally fabricated retrograde boxes designed by 3rd Ordnance Battalion which are more efficient and less costly to use than Conex containers.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2684

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184th Ord Bn
USASUPCOM, QNH



J.S. WADDELL

1LT, AGC

Ass t Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (12 May 68) 3d Ind CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)
for Period Ending 1 February 1968 - 30 April 1968, RCS
CSFOR-65 (RI)


HEAD QUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 184th
Ordnance Battalion (Ammo).

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN V. GETCHELL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 1st Log Cmd
HQ, 184th Ord Bn (Ammo)

GPOP-DT (12 May 68) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 184th Ord Bn (Ammo) for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JUN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ. AGC
Asst AG

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo)

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13. ABSTRACT